The son’s Application allegedly may be a ploy to avoid being questioned by the authorities concerned and/or by people going after “you know who”.
The court will explore the possibility that Vell Paari and Father may be feigning collective amnesia to thwart attempts by others to get their hands on assets “unlawfully” held by them.
The court cannot be a party to illegality.
The court invariably takes the side of the person who says, “I am not working and I have no source of income”.
In law, there’s no such thing as a free “eff”. If father and son try to do a number on the 2nd wife, she should sing like a bird to MACC, IRB, Bank Negara and the police (check whether there’s a murder somewhere). Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned.
The pussy is actually a gold mine if more women go to court.
The court should subpoena Mahathir to get into an exchange with Samy Vellu to help determine whether both men were mentally disordered or otherwise.
The exchange should be witnessed by medical experts subpoenaed by the Court.
Samy and other witnesses subpoenaed should be cross examined on their witness statements.
After the medical experts examine Samy Vellu privately, and separately, the court can rule whether the former MIC Chief was mentally disordered or otherwise.
If the court rules that Samy was not mentally disordered, Vell Paari should be jailed for “perjury” and/or misleading the court and attempting to get it to be party to illegality, trying to enrich himself through the court and allegedly “hijacking” the MIC-linked assets.
The father should also sue the son for defamation. If that doesn’t happen, Samy Vellu should be charged with abettment and criminal conspiracy.
Wife . . .
Civil Law Act 1956, s.7
Since the Legislature has not seen fit to define ‘wife’ in the Civil Law Act 1956 (‘the CLA’) and in the absence of anything to the contrary, the word should be read in its natural sense. Furthermore, as there was nothing in the CLA to provide that ‘wife’ in s.7(2) is confined to a woman who is married in accordance with any Act, it was open to the court to interpret the word as best it may.
Chong Sin Sen v Janaki Chellamuthu  2 CLJ 699
Civil Law Act 1956, s.7 and Income Tax Act 1967, s.2
Section 2 of the Income Tax Act 1967 defines a wife as a woman who (whether or not she has gone through any religious or other ceremony) is regarded by virtue of any law or custom as the wife of a man and it recognises and gives credence to a customary wife. The Johor State Government had recognised the plaintiff as wife of the deceased and had transferred the deceased’s low cost house into her name.
Tan Sai Hong v. Joremi Kimin & Anor  5 CLJ 614
Marriage . . .
Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, s.34
Pursuant to s.34 of the Act, the plaintiff did not even have to show that there was a marriage according to Chinese customary rites so long as there was a marriage. Section 34 of the Act refers to the existence of ‘any’ marriage and thus does not define the term ‘marriage’. Thus, the term ‘marriage’ therein should be given its ordinary everyday meaning. The fact that the plaintiff and the deceased had sent wedding invitation cards to the relatives and friends inviting them to witness the wedding and also attend a ‘tea-drinking’ ceremony as well as a wedding dinner showed that an act of marriage had taken place on 19 November 1995.
Leong Wee Shing v. Chai Siew Yin  1 CLJ 439
Spouse . . .
Interstate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (South Africa), s.1(4)(f)
In the present case, to read the word ‘spouse’ so as to include multiple spouses would be a significant departure from the ordinary, commonly understood meaning of the word, as it is used in the Act. Therefore, the word ‘spouse’ as it is used in the Act is not capable of being understood to include more than one partner to a marriage. In consequence, we must read in words to cure the defects.
As the text stands now, the word ‘spouse’ is not reasonably capable of being understood to include more than one spouse in the context of a polygynous marriage. The omission of the words ‘or spouses’ is therefore inconsistent with the Constitution and those words thus need to be added to the Act so as to cure the defect. Accordingly, I would add the words ‘or spouses’ after each use of the word ‘spouse’ in the Act.
Fatima Gabie Hashim v. Johan Hermanus Jacobs No & Ors  1 CLJ (Sya) 1
Spouse . . .
Distribution Act 1958, s.6(1)(b)
The plaintiff would have to show that she and the deceased were married under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 Act (‘Act’) if she wanted to be recognised as the spouse of the deceased. However, she was unable to show that she had become the deceased’s spouse pursuant to any of the applicable provisions of the Act. Ergo, she could not be a spouse of the deceased within the meaning of the Distribution Act 1958 for the simple reason that it was only the Act which could have conferred the status of the spouse of the deceased on her and there had been no compliance with the provisions of the Act by the Plaintiff and the deceased for that status to have been conferred on her.
Chia Siew Li v. Liew Khey Cheong & Anor  4 CLJ 36
Not willing to let go . . .
There are parallels between Mahathir and Samy Vellu. Waytha Moorthy will soon be there.
It’s not entirely clear whether former MIC President Samy Vellu was under great stress and pressure, perhaps financially, and traumatised by having to leave the political scene after over three decades as party chief.